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Abstract
Theoretical studies show that shocks to funding constraints should affect and be af-
fected by market illiquidity. However, little is known about the empirical magnitude
of such responses because of the intrinsic endogeneity of illiquidity shocks. This paper
adopts an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of illiquidity prox-
ies to infer the reaction of one measure to shocks affecting the other. Using data for
the European Treasury bond market, we find evidence that funding illiquidity shocks
affect bond market illiquidity and of a weaker simultaneous feedback reverse. We also
investigate the determinants of the magnitude of these effects in the cross-section of
bonds and find that the responses of individual bonds’ market illiquidity to funding
illiquidity shocks increase with bond duration, with the credit risk of the issuer, and
with haircuts.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets routinely experience a variety of frictions that hinder their efficient func-
tioning by impacting price formation. These frictions are usually due to the organization of
trading in a market, e.g. the design of a market structure or transaction costs, or to regu-
latory constraints, such as short-sale restrictions or market fragmentation. Several studies
have recently exposed another source of friction: trading capital. As securities can be used
as collaterals to relax borrowing constraints, there is a natural interplay between the ease
with which traders can obtain funds (funding illiquidity, henceforth) and the ease with which
an asset is traded (market illiquidity, henceforth)(see, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 and
the references therein).
Despite the mounting theoretical and empirical evidence documenting the impact of
both funding and market illiquidity on asset prices (see, among others, Vayanos and Wang,
2012; Foucault et al., 2013 and the references therein), little is known about the empirical
relationship between the two dimensions of illiquidity.1 In particular, albeit the growing
evidence that funding constraints have an impact on market illiquidity, the presence of
a feedback effect of market illiquidity on funding illiquidity has not been documented.2
This paper aims at filling this gap and proposes an empirical investigation of the dynamic
relationships between funding and market illiquidity measures in the context of the European
Treasury bond market.
Our empirical investigation focuses on this market for several important reasons. First,
the Treasury market is one of the largest and most liquid security market in the world, with
a trading volume in 2015 of USD 6 trillion in the U.S., USD 5.9 trillion in Europe.3 Second,
as Treasury securities are most often used as high-quality collateral in repo transactions, it
is reasonable to conjecture that the illiquidity of the Treasury market would therefore be
1See for a recent policy address, Dudley (2016) and the references therein.
2For further details, see the selective review of the existing literature in Section 2.
3Source: SIFMA for the U.S., and MarketAxess for Europe.
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the one that potentially exhibits the largest feedback effect to funding illiquidity shocks, in
the spirit of Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) original argument. For instance, Krish-
namurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) find that the collaterals backing the repos in the U.S.
prior to the crisis were largely composed of government securities rather than riskier private
sector assets. Third, trading of European Treasury securities falls under the jurisdiction of
the European Central Bank (ECB) and it is regulated by the same entity, the European
Commission. European Treasury bonds are traded in a large supranational secondary mar-
ket whose liquidity conditions respond to aggregate funding illiquidity shocks, and they are
denominated in the same currency. The ECB also supervises the financial institutions who
trade in the European market. At the same time, these securities are issued by countries with
different sovereign risk (and different ratings), which generates heterogeneity in the sample.
In particular, notwithstanding the introduction of the Euro, bond markets in Europe are
probably less homogenous than in the U.S., with multiple issuers, and country-specific tax
considerations. Finally, the European repo market widely differs from the U.S. repo market
along various dimensions. This in turn suggests that counterparty risk may play a different
role compared to the evidence reported in previous studies. 4
In motivating our empirical investigation we start from noting that the analysis of the
dynamic relationships between funding and market illiquidity measures suffers from various
shortcomings. One key issue that emerges from the majority of existing studies is that
the investigation of the impact of funding and/or market illiquidity on asset prices is usually
carried out by using empirical proxies that are recorded at the low frequency (usually monthly
or even annual). This data limitation makes any statement regarding potential causation
4See Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2015) for a discussion on differences between the U.S. and
the European repos markets, and their potential impact on the resiliency of the repo market. In particular,
they point out differences with regards to the proportion of triparty repo transactions and the absence of an
“unwind” mechanism. They note that in Europe, “repos with government bonds and other relatively safe
securities as collateral are predominantly CCP based and traded via anonymous electronic platforms,” and
they document an increase in the market share of CCP-based repo transactions from 42% to 71% between
2009 and 2013.
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links between the two dimensions of illiquidity dubious because of their intrinsic endogeneity
and the fact that both market and funding illiquidity may react to the same exogenous
variables.5
In order to circumvent this issue, we adopt an identification technique based on the het-
eroskedasticity of the illiquidity measures that has been successfully used in other contexts
(see, Rigobon, 2003, Rigobon and Sack, 2003; 2004 and the references therein). More specif-
ically, we assume that changes in the variance of funding illiquidity shocks relative to market
illiquidity shocks affect the covariance between market and funding illiquidity in a way that
depends on the responsiveness of market illiquidity to and from funding illiquidity. Thus,
we exploit the existence of various volatility regimes in both funding and market illiquidity
to estimate the impact of funding (market) illiquidity shocks to market (funding) illiquidity
shocks based on the observed shifts in that covariance matrix.6
We carry out our empirical investigation using a dataset containing all European Trea-
sury bonds that are traded on the Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di Stato (MTS henceforth)
platforms over the period October 1st, 2004 - February 28th, 2011. MTS is the most impor-
tant electronic platform for euro-denominated government bonds and it consists of number
of domestic markets (i.e., local MTS) and a centralized European marketplace (i.e., Eu-
roMTS). Persaud (2006) reports that the MTS platforms, around the sample period used
in the empirical investigation, jointly cover just over 70% of the overall electronic trading of
European government bonds (see also, Gyntelberg et al., 2013 and the references therein).7
5It is also worthwhile mentioning that both market and funding illiquidity are, by their very nature,
difficult to define and even more difficult to estimate. This difficulty is reflected in the multitude of empirical
proxies proposed in a vast number of studies and the fact that any proxy may be a poor approximation of
the same facet of illiquidity as they all contain a common or systematic component which correlates across
empirical proxies that is important for the pricing of illiquidity risk (see Goyenko et al., 2009 and Korajczyk
and Sadka, 2008 and the references therein). We will explore this issue in detail in Section 4.
6In our empirical estimation, we select three volatility levels based on the volatility of vStoxx index
returns, i.e., an index of the implied volatility in European stocks, and we document the behaviour of
funding and market liquidity in each of these three regimes. Some robustness checks relative to this choice
are carried out in Section 5.
7In our empirical investigation we use the consolidate set of quotes and trades occurring on both local
MTS and EuroMTS.
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We find a host of interesting results: First, contemporaneous shocks to funding illiquidity
are found to significantly affect the market illiquidity of the European Treasury market, also
after controlling for endogeneity. A one standard deviation shock to funding illiquidity, that
is a relaxation of funding constraints, generates a contemporaneous improvement of 0.15
standard deviation of market liquidity across Treasury bond markets.
Second, contemporaneous shocks to market illiquidity also significantly affect funding
conditions: we find that one standard deviation shock to market illiquidity across European
Treasury markets generates a increment of 0.08 standard deviation of funding illiquidity,
that is a tightening of funding constraints. We thus document the presence of a positive
feedback effect of the bond market illiquidity on funding illiquidity. These effects are sizable
and economically significant.8 This result is crucial for two reasons. First, it shows the
presence of a feedback effect from market illiquidity to funding illiquidity, which has been
theoretically formalized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Second, it shed further
light on the direction of this impact. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)’s model is indeed
characterized by multiple equilibria; thus the market illiquidity may yield to an increment or
a reduction of margins, thus on funding contraints, depending on the equilibrium achieved.
Our results therefore suggest that market illiquidity and funding illiquidity are mutually
reinforcing, leading to illiquidity spirals.
Third, after estimating the responses for individual bonds in our sample, we find that
the coefficients measuring the impact of funding illiquidity shocks on each bond’s market
illiquidity are on average positive, but with a different size across bonds. This suggests,
in light of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), that margins are on average destabilizing,
or that the equilibrium is characterized by illiquidity spiral effects. We then explain the
8For example, a one standard deviation decrease in the Euribor-OIS spread (a proxy for funding illiquid-
ity), generates a contemporaneous decrease of 0.35 bp of the effective spread in European Treasury bonds
(a proxy for market illiquidity), that is, an improvement of 9% of the average effective spread. Conversely,
a one standard deviation decrease in the effective spread generates a contemporaneous decrease of 0.32 bp
of the Euribor-OIS, that is, an improvement of 5.2% of the average Euribor-OIS spread.
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heterogeneity of parameter estimates by running a cross-sectional regression with the aim of
disentangling the determinants of the individual bonds’ illiquidity responses. The results of
this final exercise show that the responses of individual bonds’ market illiquidity to funding
illiquidity shocks is higher for long-term bonds, which are more capital intensive than short-
term bonds. By contrast, the responses of funding illiquidity to individual bonds’ market
illiquidity shocks are lower for bonds with longer durations or higher credit risk that are
used less frequently as collaterals in repo transactions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section
3 describes the empirical framework and introduces the measures used to proxy for market
and funding illiquidity. Section 4 describes the data used in this study, presents preliminary
summary statistics and reports the results of the main estimations. Section 5 discusses the
results of various robustness checks. A final section concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature dealing with the interplay between funding conditions and trading
in security markets is vast and rich. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) are among the first
to elaborate on the relationship between funding illiquidity and market illiquidity. When a
trader buys a security she can use it as collateral and then borrow a fraction of its value
against it. The difference between the security price and its collateral value must be financed
by traders’ own capital. When this realistic feature of trading is taken into account, illiquidity
assumes a dual perspective: They show that the two notions of funding and market illiquidity
are mutually reinforcing, and in particular that market illiquidity would also impact funding
illiquidity. Indeed, endogenous variation of margin constraints by financiers in equilibrium
may result in amplifying effects: under certain circumstances, margins can be destabilizing
leading to cases of perverse illiquidity spirals.
The idea that market illiquidity is influenced by the risk-bearing capacity of market
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participants, which in turn is related to the amount of capital allocated to this activity, is
however not new. When investors need to trade and need immediacy, their orders would
typically be matched with those of two types of financial institutions: market makers, who
temporarily absorb imbalance by holding a possibly short term position in their inventory;
or other intermediaries, like mutual or hedge funds, who may either be ready to absorb
imbalance for a longer period, or to arbitrage prices. Various models suggest that these
participants’ wealth may be used directly to buy financial assets or as collateral to borrow
cash or securities and engage into these activities.
This is for instance the case in inventory models of market making (see Demsetz, 1968,
Stoll, 1978, or Ho and Stoll, 1981) that have been formalized by Weill (2007), who analyzes
the link between the cost faced by market makers to raise capital and liquidity provision.9
More recently, D’Souza and Lai (2006) and Lescourret and Robert (2011) discuss how funding
capital may impact the behavior of dealers and thus market illiquidity in the context of bank
consolidation or order preferencing.
More generally, capital is required to arbitrage markets. This is especially important when
one needs to hold positions for some time or across large baskets of securities. Constraints on
the borrowing capacity of other financial institutions who typically absorb demand/supply
pressure, like mutual funds or hedge funds, may indeed create limits to arbitrage, as phrased
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In particular, they show that investors’ outflows from man-
aged funds can amplify financial assets’ negative ‘sentiment’ shocks. The literature has shed
light on other mechanisms, like endogenous margin constraints (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002,
Geanakoplos, 2003) or the role of repos (Huh and Infante, 2016), and analyzed their impact
in various context, i.e., across markets (Kyle and Xiong, 2001) or during a financial crisis
9Demsetz (1968) for instance writes that “this role of the specialist involves judgment, investment, and
risk taking”, while Stoll (1978) notes that “dealer inventory positions acquired in the process of providing
immediacy are financed solely at the risk free rate of interest. (...) The dealer’s personal wealth (his
investment account) and the position in the trading account serves as collateral for the borrowing of cash or
of shares.”
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(He and Krishnamurthy, 2012 and 2013).
The empirical evidence of the effects of funding constraints on market trading is, however,
usually indirect. Some studies explore the prediction that funding constraints would affect
all the operations of traders, creating a systematic source of variation in illiquidity across
financial assets. Coughenour and Saad (2004), Comerton-Forde et al. (2010), Hameed, Kang,
and Viswanathan (2010), or Jensen and Moorman (2010) document links between factors
influencing market makers’ capital constraints, such as its portfolio of stocks, losses, negative
returns, or monetary conditions; and market illiquidity. Analyzing reversal strategies, Nagel
(2012) finds evidence of withdrawal of liquidity supply, and an associated increase in the
expected returns from liquidity provision during times of financial market turmoil, consistent
with theories of liquidity provision by financially constrained intermediaries. The results of
Bessembinder et al. (2016) suggest that post-crisis regulations focused on banking may
have unintended consequences on bond market illiquidity, by comparing the participation
between bank-affiliated dealers and non-bank dealers before and after post-crisis changes in
regulation.
A few papers propose a different approach and investigate the impact of funding con-
straints on the persistence of limits to arbitrage, as evidenced for instance by deviations from
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) (see, among others, Coffey et al., 2009, Mancini Griffoli and
Ranaldo, 2010) or noise (or predictability) in the cross section of bond returns, in particular
across maturities (see for instance Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014, Garcia and Fontaine, 2012,
Hu et al., 2013, or Musto et al., 2015.)
The use of non-conventional policies (such as quantitative easing) by central banks in
the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis has also enabled to assess the impact of the
relaxation of funding constraints on asset prices. The impact of these interventions is however
debated.10 Trebbi and Xiao (2015) find no evidence of structural deterioration of liquidity
10For example, some argue that the relaxation of funding constraints might have occurred at the expenses
of market participants, as some have been evicted from the relevant markets.
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following these interventions in the U.S. corporate bond market. Deuskar and Johnson (2016)
control for links between market and funding illiquidity using the Identification through
Heteroskedasticity approach, and find that bond market illiquidity of the 10-year Indian
government bond is reduced with greater funding liquidity provision by the central bank
(RBI). Besides, Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno (2016) find that the Long-Term
Refinancing Operations (LTRO) of the European Central Bank weakened the sensitivity
of market makers’ liquidity provision to credit risk, highlighting the importance of funding
illiquidity measures as determinants of market illiquidity of the European sovereign bond
market.
Finally, other studies directly exploit differences on margin requirements across similar
assets, variations in margin policies, or shocks to the latter, in order to assess the impact
of variations of funding constraints on market illiquidity. Aragon and Strahan (2012) use
Lehman bankruptcy as instrument and find that stocks held by Lehman-connected funds
(that is, funds that used Lehman as prime broker) experienced greater increment in market
illiquidity following the bankruptcy than other stocks. Miglietta, Picillo, and Pietrunti (2015)
document a significant and positive effect of variations of CCPs’ initial margins on the Italian
MTS GC repo rates. Hedegaard (2014) finds that following a margin increase, the price
impact of trading increases for both the affected contract and for the remaining contracts
in the market, documenting funding illiquidity spillovers. Kahramand and Tookes (2016)
employ a regression discontinuity design based on the threshold rules that determine a stock’s
margin trading eligibility in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability
to borrow and a stock’s market illiquidity. They find that illiquidity is lower when stocks
become eligible for margin trading. Using a quasi-experiment, Jylh´’a (2015) shows that
the SEC-approved changes in the computation of the margin requirements for portfolios of
options traded in the U.S., that led to a decrease in the capital required to fund index option
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trading, significantly reduced market illiquidity relative to that of unaffected securities.11
Consistently with most studies in this literature, we find evidence of a positive and signif-
icant impact of funding constraints on market illiquidity. More importantly, our econometric
model also enables us to explore the reverse causality link. Our main contribution is to doc-
ument the presence of a feedback effect of market illiquidity on funding illiquidity that has
been theoretically highlighted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), to find out that this
effect is positive, and to analyze its determinants. The closest paper to ours, Boudt, Paulus,
and Rosenthal (2013), investigate a similar question, using a different approach than ours
to address the endogeneity issue between market and funding illiquidity meaasures. They
rely on two natural instruments which are supposed to isolate the exogenous variation in
equity market illiquidity, namely a variable capturing the trend in average time between
trades, and the change in yields for short-term AAA-rated corporate bonds versus change
in Treasury bill rates. They find evidence of two regimes, one in which illiquidity spirals
are stabilizing and the other in which they are destabilizing, over the period July 2006 -
May 2011.12 By contrast, we rely on an econometric approach, namely the Identification
through Heteroskedasticity, that explicitly tackles the endogeneity issue between both as-
pects of illiquidity, and we use the heterogeneity in government bonds characteristics across
European countries to investigate the determinants of the responses of market illiquidity
shocks on funding illiquidity. Our results are in line with some of their findings. However,
we differentiate from them in that we quantify empirically and economically the responses of
market illiquidity to funding illiquidity and we report evidence of a positive and significant
feedback effect of market illiquidity on funding illiquidity. Furthermore, we explain how
11Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Kitsul et al. (2016) further document that the funding illiquidity risk
is priced. The former show that securities with (nearly) identical cash flows but different margin requirements
can be traded at different prices. The latter shows that funding illiquidity risk is priced in the cross-section
of excess returns on agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
12Note that Dick-Nielsen, Gyntelberg, and Lund (2013) use Granger causality tests from funding liquidity
to market liquidity. They find that Euro spreads, their measure of funding liquidity, drive the changes in
the market liquidity on the Danish bond market on the period spanning from November 2007 to December
2011.
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bonds’ characteristics influence the magnitude of the effects.
3 Empirical methodology
In this section, we first introduce the main empirical proxies for market and funding illiquid-
ity used in the empirical investigation. Then we discuss the empirical framework adopted to
identify the relationships between funding and market illiquidity based on the heteroskedas-
ticity of illiquidity measures in the spirit of Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003).
It is worthwhile noting that the existing literature uses various measures to capture
different aspects of market and funding illiquidity across markets, that we present below.
We acknowledge that the various measures only proxy illiquidity along one dimension and
cannot perfectly reflect its multifaceted nature. Nonetheless, in our empirical investigation,
we report and discuss our baseline results both in terms of single representative measures
of market and funding illiquidity and, in the spirit of Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), the first
principal components computed across the pool of all empirical proxies discussed in this
Section.
3.1 Market illiquidity measures
Since Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the bid-ask spread remains the most popular illiquidity
measure. For each bond in our sample, we use intraday quote data to compute quoted bid-
ask spreads on daily basis. In particular, we compute for each bond j the difference between
ask and bid quotes divided by the spread midpoint. We then take the average over all best
quote revisions for day d as follows:
BASjd =
1
NQjd
NQjd∑
i=1
(Askji −Bidji )
(Askji +Bid
j
i )/2
,
where Bid ji and Ask
j
i are the i -th bid and ask quote prices, NQ
j
d is the total number of quote
revisions for day d. To avoid outliers we exclude quotes with the bid-ask spread greater than
10
100 basis points and those outside the trading hours (8:15 am - 5:30pm Central European
Time). We then average daily measures at the weekly level as follows:
BASjt =
1
D(t)
D(t)∑
d=1
BASjd,
where D(t) is the number of trading days in week t.
Second, Fleming (2003) suggests that the bid-ask spread is a valid measure in the U.S.
government bond markets because it consistently captures the variations in market illiquid-
ity. However, as the bid-ask spread is computed from the intraday data, it might be affected
by the deterministic time-of-day effects described by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). Further-
more, bid-ask spreads may not be a good measure of transaction costs if traders strategically
trade when spreads are low. In order to take this issue into account, we follow Lee (1993)
and compute the daily average effective spread of bond j, which measures the difference
between the transaction price and the mid-quote price prevailing at the time of the trade:
EBASjd =
1
NT jd
NT jd∑
τ=1
(
TPricejτ − (Ask
j
τ+Bid
j
τ )
2
)
(Askjτ+Bid
j
τ )
2
× dirτ ,
where Bid jτ and Ask
j
τ are the best ask quote prices prevailing before the τth trade, TPrice
j
τ
is the execution price, NT jd is the total number of trades for day d, and dirτ the direction
of the trade that takes value 1 if the trade is initiated by a buy order, and −1 otherwise.
Using the same notations as for the bid-ask spread, we similarly compute the weekly average
effective spread as:
EBASjt =
1
D(t)
D(t)∑
d=1
EBASjd.
Effective spreads abstract from intraday patterns since they are computed using the bid-
ask spreads prevailing at the time when actual transactions occur. Besides, they successfully
capture the (indirect) cost of an aggressive transaction, whatever its size, which indirectly
accounts for market depth. We therefore use this variable as our proxy for market illiquidity
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when focusing on single measures of market illiquidity.
Third, while the spread measures matter for brokers and investors, they may not perfectly
reflect the capacity of the market to absorb orders without moving prices, therefore they may
not be the most appropriate measures to capture the market illiquidity risk faced by market
participants. Researchers and the industry therefore use a measure of the “price impact” of
transactions, in the spirit of Kyle’s lambda.13 A market is considered less liquid if a small
order can cause a large adverse impact on prices. Following Brennan and Subrahmanayam
(1996), we measure the price impacts of a trade as in Hasbrouck (1991) using the following
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) for each bond j on a weekly basis:
qrτ =
m∑
i=1
ajt,iqrτ−i + b
j
t,0xτ +
m∑
i=1
bjt,ixτ−i + v1τ ,
xτ =
m∑
i=1
cjt,iqrτ−i +
m∑
i=1
djt,ixτ−i + v2τ ,
where qr τ is the change in mid-quote prices due to a trade at date τ and xτ is the net
aggregate buy and sell volume for all trades executed between transaction time τ − 1 and
time τ . v1τ is the innovation in quote change, v2τ is the unexpected component of the order
flow, m is the order lags in the autoregression while ajt ’s, b
j
t ’s, c
j
t ’s and d
j
t ’s are the coefficients
estimated for bond j in week t. The coefficient bj0 measures the immediate price response to
the trade and is used as our price impact measure.14
Third, another conventional empirical proxy for market illiquidity is the ILLIQ measure
developed by Amihud (2002). This measure is defined as the average of the daily ratio of
13This practice has become common in the industry. This is in particular due to data availability, but also
to the rise of algorithmic trading in the 2000s which has induced brokers to strategically split orders across
time with the objective to soften the “price impact” of their trades. The SEC and the most recent literature
similarly suggest to use the “price impact” of transactions as an alternative measure of illiquidity (see for
instance Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014.) For instance, in the “Liquidity Management Rules For
Mutual Funds And ETFs” released by the SEC on Sept 22nd, 2015, the SEC suggests a “classification of
the liquidity of fund portfolio assets based on the amount of time an asset would be able to be converted to
cash without a market impact”.
14In our empirical exercise, we find that three is the appropriate order of lags m in the model.
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bond j’s absolute returns to the total trading volume over a period of D days in week t:
ILLIQjt =
1
D
D∑
d=1
|rjd|
V jd
,
where rjd is the daily return and V
j
d is the total trading volume on day d in week t. Similarly
to Hasbrouck (1991)’s b0 coefficient, ILLIQ measure captures the average price impact over D
trading days. A bond is less liquid or, put differently, ILLIQ is high if a small trading volume
can induce a large price change. The ILLIQ measure uses more aggregated information than
the three measures defined above and may be less affected by microstructure noise.
3.2 Funding illiquidity measures
While funding illiquidity is an increasingly relevant concept that extends and complements
the one of market illiquidity, the literature has still not converged on a unambiguous way to
measure it. We consider four alternative variables to capture funding illiquidity conditions
in the European Treasury bond market.15
First, our main proxy for funding illiquidity is the spread between the Euro interbank
offered rate (Euribor) and the overnight index swap rate (OIS) both with the maturity of
one week. The Euribor-OIS spread has been discussed extensively in the literature as a
proxy for funding liquidity (see, inter alia, Taylor and Williams, 2009; Baba and Packer,
2009 and the references therein). Offered rates are interest rates over unsecured deposits
that a bank is willing to offer to another bank over a given maturity term. They can
be high because of larger default/counterparty risk or because of poor interbank liquidity
conditions. An overnight index swap is an agreement between two counterparts to pay the
difference between a fixed interest rate and an average of overnight interest rates, i.e. the
EONIA in the context of the euro area. By contrast to Euribor, OIS reflects little default or
liquidity risk as the contract does not involve the exchange of principal while only net interest
15All measures discussed in this section are computed at the weekly frequency.
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obligations are settled at maturity. The Euribor-OIS spread reflects the state of credit and
funding conditions in the interbank market. We consider variations in Euribor-OIS spread as
originating from liquidity conditions in light of the recent findings suggesting that liquidity
conditions, not credit credit conditions, are the main drivers of short-term interbank spreads
(Schwartz, 2016).
A second measure often used to proxy for funding liquidity relies on repo rates (see for
instance Dunne, Flemming and Zholos, 2013). We consider the spread between the Euribor
and the Eurepo. Eurepo is the rate at which a prime bank offers funds in euro to another
prime bank against an accepted asset of suitable quality i.e. Eurepo General Collateral
serving as the collateral in the transaction.16 The Euribor spread over the Eurepo captures
the state of funding conditions for secured money market transactions in the euro area. As
indicated by Ho¨rdahl and King (2008), a higher repo spread is associated with higher risk
aversion, a higher preference for cash as well as a greater uncertainty in the collateral value.17
This measure may therefore complement the Euribor-OIS spread by accounting for changes
in funding conditions that are not captured by interbank interest rate spreads.
A third potential measure of funding illiquidity is the difference between the average
main refinancing operation (MRO) rate and the OIS rate. MRO remains one of the most
important tools used by the European Central Bank to manage liquidity and implement
monetary policies in the euro area (ECB, 2011). MRO involves weekly auctions at which
banks borrow money with one week maturity, i.e. allotted liquidity, from the ECB secured
against a collateral accepted by the central bank. Using proprietary data on individual
demands by financial institutions during the ECB auctions between June 2005 and October
16According to Mancini et al. (2015), the repo market in the euro area is growing rapidly and is of a
similar size as the U.S. market.
17Although European Money Markets Institute decided to discontinue to publish the Eurepo index
from Jan 2015, an emerging benchmark for repo market in the euro area is RepoFunds Rate (see
http://www.repofundsrate.com). This rate captures the repo transactions executed on the BrokerTec and
MTS trading platform. However, due to the limited availability of historical data of RepoFunds Rate, we
use Eurepo rate in our study.
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2008, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2012) show that an increase in auction rates in MROs is
associated with higher funding constraints faced by banks and a reduction in market liquidity
across stock, bond and money markets in the euro area.
Finally, the last funding illiquidity measure we considered is not related to market inter-
est rate spreads but has been found significant in explaining funding conditions in the US
Treasury market, namely the noise measure introduced by Hu et al. (2013). This measure
is based on the assumption that the availability of capital allows traders to engage in arbi-
trage activities and help smooth out yield differentials around an equilibrium yield curve.
When funding constraints bind and arbitrage capital is curtailed, bond yields become more
disconnected from each other. That, as a result, leads to bonds that are priced away from
their equilibrium values. Put differently, when funding conditions deteriorate, bond prices
become more noisy. According to Hu et al. (2013), this measure of noise can be empirically
computed as the root-mean-squared-error of market yields and a given equilibrium model
yields, across all bonds:
Noiset =
√√√√ 1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
yit − yib,t
)2
,
where Nt is the number of bonds, y
j
t is the market yield of bond j and y
j
b,t is the implied
model bond yield at time t. In our empirical exercise, we first compute equilibrium yield
curves by means of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) methodology using bonds with maturity
ranging from 1 year to 10 years for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. We then compute a
noise measure for each country on weekly basis and obtain an aggregate noise measure as
the first principal component computed across the four countries.18,19
18As Hu et al. (2013) show that their main results are not specific to a particular curve-fitting method
employed, we chose to adopt a Nelson and Siegel (1987) methodology.
19In a previous version of the paper, we had included Fontaine and Garcia (2012)’s measure that is based
on the interest rate differential between on-the-run / off-the-run bonds with similar maturities. However,
since most Treasury agencies in Europe use re-openings to avoid off-the-run securities, this measure may
not be a proxy for funding liquidity in Europe. Results are however very similar when including it, and are
available upon request.
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3.3 Identification through heteroskedasticity
In this section we discuss the framework adopted to investigate the relationship between
funding and market illiquidity, acknowledging that their dynamics are endogenously deter-
mined. Theories of financial intermediation suggest a direct dual causality between the two
dimensions of illiquidity. Nonetheless, the empirical identification of this relationship is not
a trivial task. In fact, as illiquidity conditions are initially observed at different and po-
tentially low frequencies, it difficult to empirically disentangle whether any shock to one of
the two dimensions of illiquidity causes changes in the other or whether both dimensions of
illiquidity are endogenously determined.
We do not take a specific stand on the direction of causality and investigate the dynamic
interaction between market and funding illiquidity by adopting the methodology proposed
in Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003). More specifically, we assume that market
and funding illiquidity follow the system of simultaneous equations:
mt = βft + t (1)
ft = αmt + ηt, (2)
where mt and ft are measures of aggregate market and funding illiquidity, respectively; t
and ηt are the structural shocks with zero mean and variances σ
2
 and σ
2
η, and β and α
are the key parameters of interest in the model. We also assume that the shocks affecting
market and funding illiquidity in the model are uncorrelated, i.e. E(tηt) = 0.
20 Albeit very
stylized, the two equations have a straightforward interpretation in light of Brunnermeier and
Pedersen’s (2009) theoretical framework. In fact, the first equation of the system captures the
essence of the finding whereby any asset’s market illiquidity is a function of common funding
20For the sake of exposition, we use a simple model where there are no exogenous variables affecting the
dynamics of both dimensions of liquidity. However, this assumption is relaxed later. See Appendix 2 for
further details.
16
illiquidity.21 The second equation is less rooted into this specific theoretical framework.
However, it can be viewed as a simplified counterpart of the finding for which the shadow
cost of capital, used as proxy for a common funding illiquidity measure, is a function of
market illiquidity and endogenous margins.22
Several studies have recorded that the parameter β of similar relationships is different
from zero and usually statistically significant at conventional level. A couple of studies have
noted that α was also different from zero. However, existing studies did not explicitly take
into account the endogeneity of the liquidity variables. In fact, the system above cannot
be estimated, unless further information is incorporated. This is because an identification
problem occurs, as the covariance matrix of the reduced form of the above system of equation
provides only three moments (variance of funding and market liquidity and the covariance
of their shocks), but four parameters have to be estimated.
Rigobon (2003) suggests that if the variance of the structural shocks is subject to regimes,
then the identification problem can be solved.23 If we assume for simplicity that the variance
of both structural shocks  and η is subject to only two regimes (i.e. variances of both shocks
are either high or low) and, most importantly, the structural parameters α and β are stable
across regimes then the covariance matrix of the reduced form, as it is regime-specific, will
provide six moments (three per regime) for six parameters to be estimated (namely α, β,
and four variances), which solves the identification problem.
It is instructive to note that this identification procedure can be intuitively explained. In
fact, the estimation of the two structural parameters assumes that both variances of market
and funding illiquidity shocks change over time. For example, consider a sudden increase in
the variance of funding illiquidity shocks. If an econometrician observes a contemporaneous
21See Proposition 1 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009, p. 2211).
22See equation (14) and Propositions 2,3 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
23The identification through heteroskedasticity is not the only solution to the identification problem
highlighted above. In fact, the parameter α and β can still be estimated by 1) imposing zero or sign
restrictions on the parameters, 2) assuming long-run constraints, or 3) imposing constraints on variances.
See Rigobon (2003) and the references therein.
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increase in market illiquidity, given the assumption that the covariance between funding and
market illiquidity shocks is zero, the change in market illiquidity is exclusively due, in light
of the above system of equations, to the effect of funding illiquidity on market illiquidity (i.e.
β ft). By observing the changes in market and funding illiquidity in this specific volatility
regime, then it is possible to back out the value of the parameter β. A similar narrative
applies for the estimation of the other parameter α.
More formally, under the assumption of two regimes, the regime-specific covariance ma-
trix of the reduced form can be written as follows:
Ωs =
1
(1− αβ)2
[
β2σ2η,s + σ
2
,s β
2σ2η,s + ασ
2
,s
. σ2η,s + α
2σ2,
]
=
[
ω11,s ω12,s
. ω22,s
]
, (3)
where s ∈ {1, 2}. Solving for the variances in the regime-dependent reduced form, leads
to the definition of the estimates of the parameters β and α (see Appendix 1 for more details).
The β parameter is estimated as:
β =
ω12,s − αω11,s
ω22,s − αω12,s ,
and the parameter α solves the following quadratic equation:
[ω11,1ω12,2 − ω12,1ω11,2]α2 − [ω11,1ω22,2 − ω22,1ω11,2]α + [ω12,1ω22,2 − ω22,1ω12,2] = 0.
The identification through heteroskedasticity fails if the two covariance matrices are pro-
portional, i.e. the relative variances are constant across regimes. The empirical analysis in
Section 4 includes exogenous variables, and the model with latent variables is estimated as
a robustness check in Section 5.24
24See Appendix 2 for further details.
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4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we first present the data and the descriptive statistics of the various illiq-
uidity measures. Prior to estimating the reduced-form model and adopt the identification
methodology discussed in Section 3.3, we formally test that time series of the variables of
interest are indeed subject to heteroskedasticity. We finally explore the dynamic relationship
between funding and market liquidity using this framework.
4.1 European government bond markets and the trading environ-
ment
Our study examines bonds issued by the governments of the ten Euro area countries including
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain, with maturities between one year and thirty years.25 Similarly to Beber et al. (2009),
we only select fixed-rate and zero coupon bonds and exclude those with special fixed-income
features such as floating rate coupons, inflation-linked or inflation-indexed indexed bonds,
securities traded prior to issue (when issued).26
During the period investigated, the European Treasury bond markets are mostly dealer
markets with investment banks committing their own capital and providing liquidity to
facilitate trading; around 50% of trading in government bonds was conducted over the tele-
phone.27 The European government bond market is thus reputed transparent ex ante with
dealers advertising the prices at which they are prepared to trade, but not ex post.28 In
particular, closing prices are available through data vendors but there is little information
25The Euro Bond Market Study of the European Central Bank published in December 2004 shows that
three countries, namely Italy, Germany, and France, account for more than 70% of the total outstanding
amount of government bonds in the euro area. The same report shows that Luxembourg has no debt
outstanding, while the sovereign of Ireland was very small. Those two countries are thus not part of our
analysis.
26According to the study by ECB (2004), fixed-rate coupon bonds remain the most popular instrument
capturing a 65% share of the total outstanding amount.
27See the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) report published in 2006 for further details.
28An investor looking to buy or sell a bond can, again with a few exceptions, come to a bank and obtain
a price at which the dealer is willing to sell or buy that bond.
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about trade size.
Like for many other securities, European Treasury markets have experienced a growing
migration to electronic trading. A report by Greenwich Associates based on interviews
with investment grade institutional investors, indicates that 39% (resp. 47%) of European
government bonds are traded electronically in 2008 (resp. 2012).29 Besides, intermediation
in the secondary Treasury market is still almost exclusively provided by traditional bank
dealers, with little involvement of non-bank market-makers.30
The bond market data used in this study is from MTS Data, a product of MTS that is
the most important electronic platform for euro-denominated government bonds. It consists
of local MTS and a centralized EuroMTS. Persaud (2006) reports that the MTS platforms,
around the sample period used in the empirical investigation, jointly cover just over 70%
of the overall electronic trading of European government bonds (see also, Gyntelberg et al.,
2013 and the references therein). Anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the trading in
the electronic secondary market takes place in the local MTS while the amount of trading
occurring on the centralized European MTS does not exceed 5% of the total trading.31 The
MTS Data database has been extensively analyzed in previous studies (See Beber, Brandt
and Kavajecz, 2009; Dufour and Nguyen, 2012; Pelizzon et al., 2016 and the references
therein). Given the low ex post transparency on the European bond markets, it is however
not possible to precisely quantify the market share of MTS relative to other OTC trading.
MTS is an inter-dealer, fully-electronic and quote-driven market characterized by a high
degree of transparency.32 There are two types of market participants on the MTS platform:
29Source:
https://www.greenwich.com/blog/electronic-trading-bonds-growing-%E2%80%93-sort-of%E2%80%A6.
30This contrasts with the situation in the U.S. where inter-dealer platforms have granted more lenient
access to non-bank players, including PTFs (Principal Trading Firms), according to a report from the BIS
(2016).
31A report on price discovery published in August 2010 by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe
(AFME) indicates an average daily turnover on MTS of 85 billion euros (single counted and including repo).
32All platforms publish post-trade prices for trades conducted on their platforms on a realtime basis. In
the case of inter-dealer platforms, these prices can only be viewed by platform participants. Exception is
inter-dealer platform MTS, which makes post trade prices available to third parties through data vendors.
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“market makers” and “market takers.” The liquidity is provided by dealers with specific
market-making obligations. Market makers have to post firm two-sided quotes for a minimum
size, a maximum spread and a minimum number of hours during the trading day. Once a
quote is submitted to the network, it is ranked in the limit order book according to price-time
priority rules and MTS publishes the best five quotes on either side of the book. Although
MTS is considered as an “inter-dealer” platform, some participants (e.g. hedge funds) do not
meet the requirements to be “market makers” and hence can only be eligible for a market
taking status. MTS requires market takers to have net assets of at least 10 million euros.
These participants can only use market orders to hit the best outstanding quotes. The
minimum quantity for quotes and trades on MTS is one million euros. Executed trades are
immediately and automatically reported.
4.2 Data and summary statistics
We focus on bonds that are traded at least 15 days in each of the three volatility regimes
defined in the previous section. Our sample period spans from October 1st, 2004 to February
28th, 2011. 33 We first collect the daily trading summaries of all European Treasury bonds
that are traded in the platform EuroMTS provided by MTS Data. It involves the closing
bond prices, yield, year-to-maturity, bond duration, the total trading volume as well as the
number of market makers during the day. We then focus on bonds that are traded in the
platform EuroMTS at least fifteen days in each of the three volatility regimes.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the government bonds. Panel (a) describes
the statistics by country. We first collect some of the characteristics of each bond as it first
appears in the sample, namely its yield, time to maturity, duration, coupon’s rate and number
of registered market makers. Statistics on the number of trades and trade size are computed
over the whole sample period. Overall, we have 149 unique securities across the ten countries.
33Note that our sample period includes the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis but not the downgrade of
Spain and Italy that took place on October 7, 2011.
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Bonds of most countries have an average duration between five and seven years. German
bonds exhibit the lowest yields while those from Greece record the highest. Italian Treasury
bonds have the highest trading volume. This may not be surprising since Mercato dei Titoli
di Stato (MTS), the first venue for electronic trading of Treasury bonds, was indeed initially
launched in 1988 by the Italian Treasury and the Bank of Italy, before EuroMST began its
expansion across Europe in 1997. Bonds from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece
and Italy exhibit a higher activity than bonds from other countries, measured in number of
trades as well as in the number of participants. With the exception of Finland, this is in line
with the fact that the amounts of debt outstanding of those countries are larger than those
of the other countries.34
Panel (b) provides statistics on the cross-section of the 149 individual bonds (averaging
measures per bond first). Bonds in our sample are characterized by a large heterogeneity,
with a time to maturity spanning from 2.87 to 28.41 years, or a number of trades per week
spanning from almost 7 to 620. To further investigate the sources of heterogeneity, we report
additional descriptive statistics on the bonds’ characteristics. Haircuts required when the
bond is used as a collateral are available for February 2011; our measure Haircut is computed
as the average haircut per bond across time during this month.35 Haircuts are usually set as a
function of the time to maturity, the coupon’s structure and the credit quality of the issuer.
It captures the cost of using the asset as collateral. The Credit Default Swap captures
the Credit quality of the issuer.36 Finally, we introduce a proxy for the capacity of the
sovereign bond to be used as a safe asset in a Flight to Quality episode. To this end, we first
run individual bond regressions of the bond’s weekly yield change on first difference of the
34ECB (2007) mentions the following statistics on the outstanding nominal amounts of euro denominated
public debt securities as of 2004, in billion euros: Austria 114.4, Belgium 254.2, Finland 54.8, France 891.9,
Germany 1,006.6, Greece 158.8, Ireland 31.3, Italy 1,144.2 , Netherlands 215.4, Spain 330.9, Portugal 72.9.
35Since April 2010, the list of eligible assets and associated haircuts can be obtained from the European
Central Bank website https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/assets/html/index.en.html.
36CDS data is obtained for each country from Bloomberg covering the period from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb
28, 2011.
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average spread across the 5-year CDS contracts of all European countries (using data from
Bloomberg). Our variable Flight To Quality is defined as the coefficient of the regression. A
positive coefficient is usually expected: when the average credit quality decreases (i.e., when
the CDS spreads increase), the bond’s price decreases (i.e., its yield increases). A negative
coefficient thus reveals that the bond is seen by investors as a safe-haven investment when
there is a Flight-to-Quality episode. Accordingly, the dummy DFtoQ that takes value one if
Flight to Quality is negative, and zero otherwise.
We find evidence of heterogeneity in haircuts (with an average haircut of 3.44%), num-
ber of market makers (with an average number of 27 market makers per bond, that is,
approximately half of the participants), and credit quality (with an average CDS od 27.65).
Interestingly, we find that the average coefficient of the Flight-to-Quality regressions in our
sample of bonds is negative and equal to −0.06, which confirms that sovereign bonds are
traditionally viewed as safe-haven investments. This heterogeneity across individual bonds
in terms of activity and credit risk is one of the key advantages of our dataset on Treasury
markets. We will exploit all aspects of this heterogeneity more in detail in the subsequent
Section 4.5.
In our empirical investigation, our main measure of market illiquidity, the effective bid-
ask spread, as well as two alternative proxies, namely the bid-ask spread and the price
impact measures, are computed based on intraday data. In fact, the MTS Data database
contains details of quotes and trades electronically recorded with time stamps accurate to
the millisecond. The trades dataset records the execution price, quantity and the buy or sell
direction for each transaction. The quotes dataset includes the proposed price and quantity
up to the best three levels. In this study, we only consider quotes and trades during the
trading hours (8:15 am - 5:30pm Central European Time). Overall, the dataset provides us
with more than 500 million quote and trade observations (intraday) and 75,810 bond-weeks.
From these intraday data, we construct the weekly time series for each bond in the sample.
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Our last proxy, Amihud’s ILLIQ measure, is constructed on a weekly basis from daily data.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the market illiquidity measures discussed in Section
3. In Panel (a), we report the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) across bonds by
country. Both spread measures seem to be in line, but they do not rank countries in terms of
market illiquidity similarly as Amihud’s and the price impact measures. This suggests that
various measures may capture different aspects of market liquidity. Quite intuitively, the
effective spread seems to be higher in countries that are characterized by a higher average
yield, a longer average time-to-maturity, or a lower number of trades per week. Interestingly,
more participants do not seem to be linked to higher market liquidity.
Panel (b) reports the statistics of the distribution of the cross-section of bonds. In line
with arguments suggesting strategic order submission from market participants, effective
spread are on average lower than quoted spreads. Note that spreads are measured in basis
points: an average effective spread of 3.74bp on an average transaction size of 7.11 million
euros corresponds to a transaction cost of 2, 659 euros. The large heterogeneity across bonds’
liquidity measures in our sample echoes the heterogeneity on their characteristics documented
in Table 1.
Panel (c) reports correlations between the various illiquidity measures. In line with
existing studies, all measures are found to be highly correlated. Amihud’s illiquidity measure
is less correlated with the other measures than any other pair, with correlation coefficients
with the three other measures ranging from 0.64 to 0.66. Nonetheless, the correlations
reported are large and economically significant. This suggests that our results should be
robust to the choice of the market illiquidity measure.
We compute our main measure of funding illiquidity as well as two alternative proxies
using data on OIS, Euribor and Repo rates from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream. We use our
dataset containing all bonds traded in EuroMTS to compute the Noise measure. Funding
illiquidity measures are reported in Table 3, panel (a) but only the first two measures can
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be directly compared. The Euribor-Repo spread is on average higher than the Euribor-OIS
spread, which reflects that the former measure may reflect changes in funding conditions
that may not be only related to the counterparty risk of the institution but to changes in
market conditions. All measures exhibit large standard deviations denoting some potential
misspecification due to the estimation process and the variability of market interest rates.
Panel (b) of Table 3 reports the correlation among all funding illiquidity measures. All
variables are significantly correlated at 1% level. The correlation between the noise measure
and the Euribor-OIS spread is small, but it is highly correlated with the MRO, i.e., the
central bank rate spread.37
4.3 Systematic components of market and funding illiquidity
In this section we discuss the construction of the systematic components FLIQ and MLIQ
as the first principal component of the relative menu of empirical proxies from both panels
of funding and market illiquidity measures defined in section 3. The results reported in
Table 4, panel (a) suggests that the first principal component of both panel of measures
is sufficient to capture 81 and 57 percent of the cross-sectional variability of the market
and funding illiquidity measures, respectively. This result echoes and corroborates the one
reported in Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) where a single factor can explain between 4 and
26 percent of the variability of the cross-section of market liquidity proxies computed for
individual equities. This result also suggests that there are significant commonalities driving
the time-series variation of funding and market illiquidity in the European Treasury bond
markets.
In panel (b), we notice that the factor loadings of all individual measures on their first
principal component are positive and in the interval [0.40, 0.59]. The second component of
funding liquidity seems to be linked to the MRO and Noise measures, while the second com-
37The time series of all funding illiquidity proxies, not reported to save space, show that all measures
increase at the end of 2009. This is in line with the timing of European sovereign bond crisis. See the next
Section 4.3 for a discussion of the time-series dynamics of the systematic component of funding illiquidity.
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ponent of market liquidity is correlated with Amihud’s ILLIQ measure. All other individual
measures loads negatively to the second principal component. This suggests that the first
principal component captures most of the relevant information.
Besides, correlations with the standard liquidity measures reported in Panel (c) all stand
within an interval [0.60, 0.96]. The Repo measure seems to be the most correlated with
the systematic funding liquidity measure (i.e., with correlation coefficient of 0.88), while
the effective spread seems to be the most correlated with the systematic market liquidity
measure (i.e., with a correlation coefficient of 0.96).
4.4 Empirical Results
Figure 1 plots the time series of the market illiquidity measure in panel (a), and of the funding
illiquidity measure in panel (b). It is worth noting that the estimated proxies for the two
dimensions of liquidity are significantly correlated over time. In fact, the contemporaneous
correlation between the systematic component of market and funding liquidity is equal to 0.71
and is statistically significant at 1 percent level.38 However, as highlighted in the previous
sections, the intrinsic endogeneity between two variables may lead to spurious conclusions.
We address and discuss this important issue in the next section.
Prior to estimating the reduced-form model, we first formally test that the time-series
of the variables of interest exhibit heteroskedasticity. To this aim we use two tests that are
routinely used to assess the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity: the White (1980) test and
the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test.39 The results of the test are reported in Table 5, panel (a)
and there is a unambiguous evidence that the liquidity proxies exhibit heteroskedasticity
38Similar calculations for the measures BAS, EBAS, IMP and ILLIQ against FLIQ record correlations
equal to 0.71, 0.70, 0.63, and 0.64, respectively. Conversely, correlation coefficient computed for the Euribor-
OIS spread, the Euribor-Repo spread, the MRO-OIS spread, and the noise measure against MLIQ are equal
to 0.40, 0.47, 0.78, and 0.72 respectively.
39Note that the empirical tests adopted in this study are only two of the potential options available in
the existing literature. However, we rely on those two approaches as they are routinely used in empirical
works and, most importantly, because the goal of our study is not to find and empirically characterize any
heteroskedasticity in the time-series of the illiquidity variables but exploit the existing heteroskedasticity to
tackle the problem of endogeneity.
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over the sample period, whatever the measure of liquidity considered. This evidence allows
us to confidently use the procedure discussed in Section 3.3.
Table 5, panel (b) reports the variances and covariances of the market and funding liquid-
ity measures in the three regimes. The “low vStoxx” regime (12.31% of our observations) is
characterized by a low volatility of both market and funding liquidity measures. The “high
vStoxx” regime (10.77% of our observations) is characterized by a high volatility of both
market and funding liquidity measures. The intermediate regime is characterized by a high
volatility of funding liquidity (namely 0.38, relative to 0.03 in the low vStoxx regime) but a
relatively low volatility of market liquidity (namely 0.26 relative to 0.09 in the low vStoxx
regime). The variances of the innovations when market and funding illiquidity are proxied
by the effective spread and the Euribor-OIS spread respectively, reported in the three rows
below, are qualitatively similar. The three regimes exhibit sufficient variation in volatilities
that is required to identify our parameters of interest. Figure 1 plots the time series of fund-
ing and market liquidity measures and their residuals in the three different regimes. While
the “high vStoxx” regime mainly corresponds to the peak of the financial crisis, observations
in the two other regime do not correspond to a specific time period.
We finally estimate the reduced-form model discussed in Section 3.3 which now includes
exogenous variables.40 In the empirical investigation we include as exogenous variables the
mutual fund flows from Treasury bond portfolios, the variations in M2 money supply in
the Euro area and the changes in the implied volatility obtained from stock market option
prices in the euro-area, i.e the vStoxx index and the stock returns from financial companies.
These variables aim at accounting for factors known to impact liquidity. The first two
variables (i.e., mutual funds’ flows and M2 money supply) aim at capturing variations in the
borrowing capacities of financial institutions/arbitrageurs, either due to the size of the assets
under management or to monetary policy. We proxy mutual funds’ flow by inflows/outflows
40See Appendix 1 for full details.
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in billion USD in government bonds with intermediate and long maturities for the European
countries, from EFPR reports.41 As the time series is reported at the monthly frequency,
we use a linear interpolation to convert the variables to the weekly frequency. The data
on variations in money supply M2 come from ECB’s monetary statistics. We control for
volatility since many market microstructure models suggest that volatility negatively impacts
market liquidity (e.g., either due to inventory management or to adverse selection costs).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also predict that volatility is a state variable affecting
market liquidity. Finally, we also include an end-of-the-month dummy to control for the
discrete variation of European repo rates during the last trading day of each month. This
choice is due to the empirical observation of European banks that are required to report
their positions to the European Central Bank on the last trading day of each month. To
complete the set of exogenous variables we also include the lagged values of the systematic
funding and market illiquidity variables.
The results are reported in Table 6. The first two columns report the results of the
estimation using MLIQ and FLIQ as principal components, and the last two columns report
those using EBAS and Euribor-OIS as measures of market and funding illiquidity. Contem-
poraneous shocks to funding illiquidity are found to significantly affect the average market
illiquidity across all local European Treasury bond markets. The reverse causality link also
applies as contemporaneous shocks to our proxy of market illiquidity significantly affects
funding illiquidity in the European Treasury markets. Both effects are sizable and econom-
ically significant whether one considers the principal components or the direct proxies of
liquidity. When one considers the systematic measures, one standard deviation shock to
funding liquidity (i.e. relaxation of funding constraints) generates a contemporaneous im-
provement of market liquidity of 0.151 standard deviation across Treasury bond markets
in Europe, while one standard deviation shock to systematic market illiquidity generates a
41For further details on EPFR reports see also Jotikasthira et al. (2012) and the references therein
28
contemporaneous change of 0.080 standard deviation in funding illiquidity. Using the direct
proxies, one standard deviation decrease of the Euribor-OIS spread (that is, a decrease by
9.92 basis points) generates a contemporaneous decrease 0.35 bps of the effective bid-ask
spreads across Treasury bond markets in Europe (that is, 0.120 times 2.92 bp), which cor-
respond to an improvement of 9% relative to the average effective spread. A one standard
deviation decrease in effective bid-ask spreads (that is, 2.92 bp) generates a contempora-
neous decrease of the Euribor-OIS spread of 0.32 bps (that is, 0.033 times 9.92 bp), which
corresponds to an improvement of 5.2% relative to the average Euribor-OIS spread. This
result documents that there indeed a feedback effect from market to funding liquidity. Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009)’s model is however characterized by multiple equilibria, one
of which is characterized by the reinforcement of market and funding liquidity. We find that
both β and α are positive, which is consistent which such an equilibrium. This is important
because this equilibrium may yield liquidity spirals.
Mutual funds’ net inflows and an increase in M2 money supply significantly reduce mar-
ket illiquidity. Both signs are consistent with the prediction that higher “macroeconomic”
liquidity increases market liquidity. Their impact on funding illiquidity is however not sig-
nificant. This finding may seem counter-intuitive; it is however in line with Chordia et al.
2005, who show that those variables are responsible for the commonalities in market liquidity
measures. Stock market volatility (vStoxx) is positively and significantly related to bond
market illiquidity but not to funding illiquidity. Consistent with much anecdotal evidence,
we find that funding illiquidity significantly increases at the end of the month. This sup-
ports the argument that European banks are reluctant to lend to each other at the end of
the month for reporting reasons, therefore, funding liquidity is reduced.
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4.5 Bond characteristics and liquidity elasticities: a cross-sectional
analysis
The results reported in Table 6 provide evidence that, after controlling for endogeneity,
funding illiquidity positively impacts market illiquidity, and vice-versa. Two mechanisms
could be at play to explain this finding. First, constraints on access to capital of market
makers would impact the risk premium required to hold an inventory position. Second,
constraints on access to capital of hedge funds or arbitrageurs may decrease market liquidity
because they use to absorb the investors’ demand. In particular, Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011) show that market liquidity may depend on margin requirements. In this section, we
take advantage of the existence of different margin requirements across maturities or across
countries to test the link between margin conditions and the strength of the relationship
between funding and market liquidity.
To this end, we define two measures of bond market illiquidity per bond, one that is
based on the direct market liquidity proxy that will be used with the funding liquidity
measure defined as a direct component, and the other that builds on the market liquidity
measure MLIQ that will be used with the funding liquidity measure defined as first principal
component. We first consider the direct measure of market liquidity, the effective bid-ask
spread EBASj,t that we have computed for each individual bond j, and its mean EBASj.
The market illiquidity of bond j, SEBASj,t is then defined as follows:
SEBASj,t = EBASj,t − EBASj.
The SEBASj proxy is demeaned which enables a better comparison of the estimates. Notice
however that is does not distinguish between the systematic and the idiosyncratic compo-
nents of market liquidity. Next, we consider the MLIQt variable defined in section 3.1 as
the first principal component of the cross-sectional averages of our four proxies for market
liquidity, as the systematic component of each bond’s market liquidity. For each individ-
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ual bond j, we compute the total market illiquidity measure MLIQj,t as the first principal
component of the four proxies of market liquidity, namely the bid-ask spread, the effective
spread, Amihud’s illiquidity and the price impact, measured at the individual bond level.
The idiosyncratic market illiquidity of bond j, IdioMLIQj,t is then defined as follows:
IdioMLIQj,t = MLIQj,t −MLIQt
We use the individual variables to carry out the estimations in the reduced form model
used in Section 3.3. We estimate the same specification that includes lags of illiquidity
variables and the set of control variables. This exercise provides us with a cross-sectional
panel of contemporaneous coefficients (αj, βj). Table 7, panel (a) reports statistics on the
distribution of these coefficients. Using the IdioMLIQj idiosyncratic measure, the average
of individual βj’s is much smaller than the estimate of β in the global estimation. It thus
seems that funding illiquidity mainly impacts the systematic component of market illiquidity,
MLIQ, rather than the idiosyncratic illiquidity of each bond. Note also that we do not
necessarily expect a significantly positive α when considering the idiosyncratic component
of market liquidity only; we are mainly interested in the factors explaining its cross-sectional
variations.
We then use the estimates of (αj, βj) to analyze what variables impact the two elasticities
in the cross section of bonds. To this end, we run the following regression on the bond panel
using Yj = (αj, βj):
Yj = a
Y
0 + a
Y
1 ×Duration+ aY2 × CDS + εYj . (4)
All measures are defined in Section 4.2. Our pool of explanatory variables for the coeffi-
cient β of the impact of funding on market illiquidity comes from the theoretical literature.
According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), when funding illiquidity increases, traders
become reluctant to take on positions, especially capital intensive positions in high-margin
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securities. We therefore include the Duration and the credit risk of the issuer CDS as
explanatory variables (first individually then together), and we expect both of them to posi-
tively impact the betas, that is, aβ1 > 0 and a
β
2 > 0. Both variables influence the haircuts on
the bond. As described in Section 4.2, we however only have data on haircuts on February
2011 for the bonds that did not mature at that date.42 In a second specification, we therefore
replace Duration and CDS by Haircut.
Yj = b
Y
0 + b
Y
1 ×Haircut+ εYj . (5)
We expect the coefficient bβ1 to be positive. Finally, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
suggest that if investors anticipate that some risky high-margin securities would have more
liquidity risk, the liquidity differential between high-volatility and low-volatility securities
may increase in bad times. We thus add as explanatory variable the exposure of securities
to Flight to Quality, and we expect our dummy DFtoQ to have an impact on the magnitude
of the effect of funding to market liquidity.
Yj = c
Y
0 + c
Y
1 ×DFtoQ + εYj . (6)
The dummy takes value one when the security is perceived as safer by the investors. For
this reason, we expect cβ1 < 0.
The theoretical literature is more silent on the drivers of α which captures the impact
of market on funding illiquidity. We thus use the same explanatory variables as in the
regressions of β. The main prediction comes from the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009): if the feedback effect from market to funding illiquidity is due to the use of securities
as collaterals, it should be more severe for securities that do not use much capital, i.e., that
have a low haircut, a high duration, or a high CDS. We thus expect aα1 < 0, a
α
2 < 0, and
bα1 < 0.
42Haircuts are highly and significantly correlated with bond duration and CDS (with a correlation coef-
ficient of 0.6 for both).
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The results of the two cross-sectional regressions for both α and β are reported in Table
7, panels (b) and (c). As expected, the impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity (β)
significantly increases with duration, with credit risk, with the bond’s haircut, and decreases
significantly when bonds are perceived as safer assets. Overall, the market liquidity of the
bonds that are less liquid or perceived as such is more affected by variations in funding
liquidity, in line with theory.
By contrast, duration, credit risk, and haircuts have an opposite effect on the (αs) coef-
ficients. In particular, we find that α’s significantly decrease with haircut. This is consistent
with the fact that bonds that have a higher haircut are probably used less frequently as
collateral, so that variations in market liquidity for the latter impact less funding liquid-
ity. Interestingly, bonds that are viewed as safe in Flight To Quality episodes soften the
magnitude of the effect of market liquidity on funding liquidity.
5 Robustness checks
We perform a number of additional tests to assess the robustness of our baseline results.
More specifically, we investigate the role played by the sample of bonds used in the empirical
exercise, we use a different volatility-regime classification, we estimate the model by splitting
our sample into two subsamples (one before and one during the financial crisi), and we
estimate an alternative parametrization of the reduced-form model. In all cases, we document
that the baseline results reported in the previous section are robust to alternative choices.
5.1 Sample of bonds
As described in section 4.2, our analysis focuses on a subsample of 149 bonds that are traded
in the platform EuroMTS at least fifteen days in each of the three volatility regimes, defined
exogenously based on variation in the vStoxx index. This restriction enables us to compare
estimates of αj and βj in the cross-section of bonds since all the estimations are based on
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the same volatility regimes. However, it induces us to restrict our attention to a subsample
of bonds. In this section, we check the robustness of our results to the sample of bonds,
by estimating the reduced-form model using an extended sample of 452 bonds traded in
EuroMTS over the sample period.
Table 8, Panel (a) reports some descriptive statistics on the full sample, by country. The
comparison with Table 1, Panel A shows that the characteristics of the bonds by country in
the subsample are similar to those in the full sample, except for the fact that they have on
average shorter years-to-maturity and duration. Given that the subsample requires trades in
each volatility regime, it may not be surprising to observe that the condition mainly excludes
bonds with shorter maturities. Including more bonds with shorter maturities increases the
trading volume of all but Finish bonds.
We estimate the model for the direct proxies of market and funding liquidity, and for
the measures defined as the first principal components. We construct systematic compo-
nents FLIQ and MLIQ from both panels of funding and market illiquidity measures across
proxy measures and Treasury bond markets by a adopting principal components approach.
The results (omitted for brevity) suggest that the first principal component of both panels
captures 57 and 75 percent of the cross-sectional variability of the funding and market illiq-
uidity measures, respectively. Besides, the heteroskedasticity tests also reject the null for
both FLIQ and MLIQ at the 1% level.
Table 8, Panel (b) reports the estimates of the reduced-form model similar to the one
discussed in Section 4.4. The results are perfectly in line with those reported in Table
6, although slightly less economically significant. In particular, both effects of funding to
market illiquidity and vice-versa are positive and significant, with coefficients of 0.06− 0.07
(depending on the liquidity measures) for β and 0.05 for α respectively.
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5.2 Different Volatility-regime Classification
As an additional robustness check we identify the volatility regimes directly from the time-
series data. More specifically, we define the various regimes from the reduced-form residuals
by computing rolling-window variances of N-week worth of observations for each variable.
As in Rigobon and Sack (2003), a high (low) volatility regime is assigned if the volatility of
that variable is larger (smaller) than its average value plus the value of the average volatility
times a coefficient c.
We report the results of the estimation using a moving-average estimate of volatility for
the various time series of N = 20 weeks with a threshold parameter c = 0.5.43
Table 11 A reports the results of the estimation of the reduced-form model defined in
(3) on the sample of 149 bonds and on the full sample, for the direct measures of illiquidity
and the first principal components. Again, both effects of funding to market illiquidity and
vice-versa are positive and significant. The coefficients of 0.150 for β and 0.067 for α for the
subsample that we obtain when using principal component measures, and of 0.132 for β and
0.04 for α for the full sample, are very close from the values obtained with the alternative
definition of volatility regimes.
5.3 Stability of the estimates
The Identification by Heteroskedasticity is based on the assumption that parameters α and
β are constant over time, which may be violated. In particular, the impact of funding on
market liquidity or its feedback effect may be different in abnormal times. To investigate
this point, we split our sample into two subsamples around Lehman Brother’s bankrupcty
in the fall of 2008, and we re-estimate the model on each of these subsamples.44 Table 9
43We have used additional rolling windows of 10, 30 and 40 weeks to estimate the volatility of the various
time series and additional thresholds of c = 0.25, 0.75, 1.0 to classify high-volatility regimes. The results of
this robustness check are available upon request. In all cases, the results of our baseline estimations are
confirmed.
44For brevity we do not report the details of the characteristics of these two subsamples, nor descrptive
statistics on the liquidity measures or on volatility regimes by period. These statistics are available upon
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reports the results. We observe that the estimates of both parameters of interest (α and β)
are quite similar both economically and statistically before and during the financial crisis,
except for the market to funding coefficient (α) computed usinf the individual measures of
market and funding liquidity (namely the effective spread and the Euribor-OIS spread), that
is not significant at the 10% level during the crisis.
To further investigate the stability of the estimates, we follow Rigobon (2016) and use a
test based on quintile regressions. The test is based on the idea that the instability of the
parameters would create a non-linearity in the estimates. In that case, estimates should shift
across the quintiles. Table 10 presents the test for stability across quintile in the relation
between the market liquidity of bond j and the funding liquidity. p-values indicate that we
cannot reject the equality of the median and respectively the 70%, 80% and 95% quintiles at
the 10% level. Overall, Table 9 and Table 10 suggest that the assumption on the parameters’
stability would not be a concern.
5.4 Alternative models
As an additional robustness check we estimate an alternative model, based on Rigobon
and Sack (2003). The model includes an unobservable common shock, which accounts for
potential omitted control variables, but prevents from estimating the parameter α, measuring
the impact of market liquidity on funding liquidity. Instead, the model provides an estimate
of a parameter θ, which is defined as
θ =
(1 + α× γ)
β + γ
,
where γ is the coefficient of the unobserved variable. Table 12 reports the estimates of this
model, for both the subsample of 149 bonds and the full sample, for both approaches to
measuring market and funding illiquidity. In both cases, the effects of funding to market
illiquidity and vice-versa are positive, significant, and relatively close to that obtained in our
request.
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model based on Rigobon (2003).
6 Conclusions
This paper adopts an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of illiquidity
measures to infer the magnitude of the impact of market illiquidity to and from funding
illiquidity by taking the endogeneity of the illiquidity measures explicitly into account. Us-
ing data for the European Treasury bond market, we find evidence, consistent with the
extant literature, that funding illiquidity shocks affect bond market illiquidity. However,
we document the existence of a positive and significant feedback between market and fund-
ing illiquidity: put differently, market illiquidity shocks tighten funding constraints. We
exploit the heterogeneity of our sample of bonds, characterized by different durations and
default risk, to investigate the determinants of the magnitude of these effects. We find that
the market-to-funding illiquidity effect is stronger for short-term bonds and for bonds used
as collaterals in repo transactions. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of the
volatility regimes, alternative samples of bonds, and alternative model specifications. Our
findings suggests the presence of destabilizing liquidity spirals. As shown by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), central banks can help mitigate market liquidity problems in such
equilibria by boosting speculators’ funding conditions during a liquidity crisis.
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7 Appendix 1
The appendix follows the identification strategy in the Section 3.3. The covariance matrix
of the reduced-form residuals in (1) model in each regime i (i = 1, ..., I volatility regimes)
can be given as:
Ωi ≡
[
$11,i $12,i
. $22,i
]
(7)
=
1
(1− αβ)2
[
β2σ2η,i + σ
2
,i β
2σ2η,i + ασ
2
,i
. σ2η,i + α
2σ2,i
]
, (8)
where αβ 6= 1. In each regime, the covariance matrix provides three equations to solve
the unknown variables. The three equations can be written as follows:
β2σ2η,i + σ
2
,i = (1− αβ)2$11,i (9)
β2σ2η,i + ασ
2
,i = (1− αβ)2$12,i (10)
σ2η,i + α
2σ2,i = (1− αβ)2$22,i (11)
Solving these equations leads to the following moment condition:
$12,i − β$22,i
$11,i − β$12,i − α = 0, (12)
When the number of volatility regimes I is exactly the same as the number of endogenous
variables, i.e. two in our case, β needs to statistfy the following condition:
$12,1 − β$22,1
$11,1 − β$12,1 =
$12,2 − β$22,2
$11,2 − β$12,2 , (13)
After some algebra, β solves the quadratic equation45:
45The quadratic equation has two solutions. One is the values of α and β in the system of equation. The
other is given as the system in which the order of funding liquidity is first and then market liquidity. In that
case, the solution gives the values α∗ = 1/β and β∗ = 1/α.
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aβ2 − bβ + c = 0, (14)
where
a = $22,1 ×$12,2 −$22,2 ×$12,1 (15)
b = $22,1 ×$11,2 −$22,2 ×$11,1 (16)
c = $12,1 ×$11,2 −$12,2 ×$11,1 (17)
When the regimes of volatility I is exactly greater than the number of endogenous vari-
ables, GMM estimation can be used with the moment condition specified as above.
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8 Appendix 2
This appendix discusses an extension of the reduced-form model presented in Section 3.3
of the main text by including exogenous variables. As Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and
Sack (2003) we start from the observation that market and funding liquidity are determined
simultaneously and we model their time-series dynamics by using the following system:
mt = βft + θxt + γzt + t, (18)
ft = αmt + φxt + zt + ηt, (19)
where mt is the systematic component of market illiquidity, ft is the systematic component
of funding illiquidity, xt is a vector of exogenous variables, zt is a latent variable, t and ηt
are shocks in each equation. The variable zt is included to capture the influence of other
determinants of illiquidity that we do not observe, unlike xt that are instead observable. For
identification purposes, as in Rigobon and Sack (2003, p. 643) the parameter of the common
shock zt is normalized to one in the second equation while β, α, θ, φ are the free parameters
of the model.
The equations can be written in a reduced-form model as follows:
(
mt
ft
)
= Φxt +
(
νmt
νft
)
,
where the reduced form residuals
(
νmt and ν
f
t
)
are related to the structural shocks as
follows:
νmt =
1
1− αβ [(β + γ) zt + βηt + t] , (20)
νft =
1
1− αβ [(1 + αγ) zt + ηt + αt] (21)
The covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals can be given as:
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Ω =
1
(1− αβ)2
[
(β + γ)2σ2z + β
2σ2η + σ
2
 (1 + αγ) (β + γ)σ
2
z + β
2σ2η + ασ
2

. (1 + αγ)2 σ2z + σ
2
η + α
2σ2
]
, (22)
We assume that the data exhibits i = 1, ..., I volatility regimes, of which the covari-
ance matrix of the reduced form residuals in regime i can be written as Ωi. Let θ =
(1 + αγ) / (β + γ) . and ∆Ωij,km denote element (k, m) of the matrix ∆Ωij, , which is the
difference between the covariance matrix in regime i and regime j. If θβ 6= 1, which assures
finite variance, Rigobon and Sack (2003) suggests the following moment conditions with
regime i (i 6= 1):
∆Ωi1,12 − β∆Ωi1,22
∆Ωi1,11 − β∆Ωi1,12 − θ = 0, (23)
When the number of volatility regime I is exactly the same as the number of endoge-
nious variables plus the number of common shock, Rigobon and Sack (2003) shows that the
parameter β can be obtained by solving the quadratic equation:
aβ2 − bβ + c = 0,
where
a = ∆Ω31,22∆Ω21,12 −∆Ω21,22∆Ω31,12 (24)
b = ∆Ω31,22∆Ω21,11 −∆Ω21,22∆Ω31,11 (25)
c = ∆Ω31,12∆Ω21,11 −∆Ω21,12∆Ω31,11 (26)
If the number of I is greater than the number of endogenious variables plus the number of
common shock, GMM estimation technique needs to be applied. Using the rolling-variance
method, we specify I = 4 volatility regimes, one where the two liquidity measures demon-
strate high conditional volatility, two regimes where one variable remains in low volatility
state, one regime where all variables stay in low volatility state. We obtain the parameters
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by using the (23) moment conditions in the GMM estimation. We establish the distributions
of the estimated coefficients and perform significance tests in 1000 replications.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The table reports the average statistics for the ten Euro-area government bond markets. We only consider
fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued by the central government
and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. We focus on the bonds that are traded at
least 15 days in each of the 3 volatility regimes. Panel (a) reports the country average statistics, and Panel
(b) reports statistics on the cross-section of bonds. In the tables, No. denotes the total number of bonds for
each country, Yield is the end-of-day miquote bond yield (in percentage),YTM is the years to maturity (in
years), Duration is the bond duration (in years), Coupon is the coupon rate (in %), is the number of market
makers over the whole sample period, Trades is the average weekly number of transactions per bond over
the whole sample period and Size is the average trade size in mio euros over the whole period. In Panel
(b), we additionally report statistics on the bond’s Haircut, the number of Market Makers, the CDS of the
bond, a proxy for Flight to Quality defined as the coefficient of the bond’s yield change regressed on the first
difference of the average spread across the 5-year CDS contracts across countries (from Bloomberg), and a
dummy DFtoQ that takes value one if Flight to Quality is negative, and zero otherwise.
Statistics by country
(a)
Country No. Yield YTM Duration Coupon No. MM Trades Size
Austria 10 3.82 10.17 9.2Y 4.51 22 34 8.34
Belgium 12 3.71 10.32 9.12 4.72 29 124 8.25
Finland 4 3.38 6.29 7.23 4.90 29 143 9.47
France 29 3.52 9.80 7.01 4.80 24 133 7.06
Germany 23 3.27 9.73 8.7 4.32 20 146 6.66
Greece 14 4.11 7.81 7.49 5.15 27 132 7.58
Italy 29 3.97 11.21 7.44 2.44 51 1,219 5.67
Netherlands 11 3.50 11.01 8.91 4.74 28 40 9.02
Portugal 5 3.80 7.03 7.58 4.27 23 70 9.09
Spain 12 3.73 8.46 8.03 4.76 29 92 8.74
Cross-sectional statistics
(b)
Mean Median Std Min Max
No. 149
Yield 3.68 3.90 0.93 0.12 6.18
YTM 9.25 7.23 6.64 2.86 28.41
Duration 8.41 8.14 2.98 2.74 16.92
Coupon 4.11 4.00 1.36 1.38 8.50
Part. 27 23 15 8 76
Trades 20 8 37 0 562
Size 7.11 7.00 3.23 0.50 230.50
Haircut 3.44 3.00 2.22 0.50 10.50
CDS 27.65 21.12 18.11 4.82 89.67
Flight to quality -0.06 -0.04 0.11 -1.11 0.04
DFtoQ 0.93 1 0.26 0 1
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Table 2: Statistics of market liquidity
The table reports the summary statistics of market liquidity variables across European Treasury bond mar-
kets. We only consider fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued by
the central government and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. Market liquidity
variables include the the effective spread (EBAS, in bp), bid-ask spread (BAS, in bp), price-impact (IMP)
and Amihud’s ILLIQ measure. The definition of all measures is discussed in Section 3. The market liquidity
variables are equal-weighted averages across all bonds and markets on a weekly basis. Panel (a) reports the
country average statistics (the mean and the standard deviation in parenthesis), and Panel (b) reports the
mean, median, standard deviation, min and max of the cross-section of individual bonds. Panel (c) reports
the correlations between the four market liquidity measures.
Descriptive statistics of market liquidity variables by country
(a)
Market Liquidity Measure
Country EBAS BAS ILLIQ IMP
Austria 4.65 (4.54) 8.52 (5.20) 2.14 (1.58) 0.79 (1.45)
Belgium 3.89 (3.52) 7.32 (4.61) 1.78 (1.22) 0.61 (0.87)
Finland 3.03 (3.39) 6.08 (4.79) 1.17 (1.07) 0.50 (0.92)
France 3.24 (2.19) 7.37 (3.43) 2.38 (1.25) 0.70 (0.98)
Germany 2.42 (1.12) 5.88 (2.06) 1.61 (1.03) 0.97 (1.44)
Greece 3.87 (4.72) 6.53 (4.62) 1.74 (1.55) 1.30 (2.58)
Italy 3.50 (2.97) 7.14 (4.31) 1.40 (0.82) 0.64 (0.65)
Netherlands 2.97 (2.03) 6.77 (3.14) 1.67 (0.72) 0.46 (0.46)
Portugal 4.50 (6.78) 6.90 (5.45) 1.25 (1.69) 0.68 (1.56)
Spain 4.42 (4.61) 7.55 (5.12) 1.74 (1.26) 0.67 (0.93)
Cross-sectional statistics of market liquidity variables
(b)
Market Liquidity Measure
Panel EBAS BAS ILLIQ IMP
Mean 3.74 7.90 1.92 0.72
Median 2.07 4.53 1.79 0.42
Std Dev 2.92 4.73 0.69 0.70
Min 1.02 3.19 0.77 0.21
Max 11.32 16.08 4.46 3.80
AC(1) 0.95 0.96 0.69 0.86
Correlations of market liquidity measures
(c)
Market Liquidity Measure
Variables EBAS BAS ILLIQ Impact
EBAS 1 0.92 0.66 0.85
BAS 1 0.64 0.75
ILLIQ 1 0.63
Impact 1
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Table 3: Statistics of funding liquidity
Panel (a) reports the summary statistics of European funding liquidity variables from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28,
2011. Funding liquidity variables include the spreads (in basis points) between Euribor, General Collateral
Repo, the ECB’s Main-Refinancing Operation Rates over the overnight-index-swap (OIS) rate or the Euribor,
and the Hu, Pan and Wang (2013) measure of noise. The definition of all measures is discussed in Section
3. The funding liquidity variables are equal-weighted averages across markets on a weekly basis. Mean, Std,
Min, Max denote the average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables. AC(1) denotes
the first-order autocorrelation coefficients of the variables. Panel (b) reports the correlations between the
five funding liquidity measures.
Descriptive statistics on Funding Liquidity measures
(a)
Funding Liquidity Measure
Euribor Repo MRO Noise
Mean 6.07 6.36 18.16 0.19
Median 2.80 3.20 2.15 0.03
Std Dev 9.92 9.34 26.00 0.22
Min -17.00 -7.50 -8.50 0.03
Max 98.90 85.00 111.00 1.02
AC(1) 0.75 0.86 0.94 0.92
Correlations of funding liquidity measures
(b)
Funding Liquidity Measures
Variables Euribor Repo MRO Noise
Euribor 1 0.94 0.24 0.14
Repo 1 0.29 0.28
MRO 1 0.64
Noise 1
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Table 4: Principal Component Analysis
Panel (a) reports the results from the principal component analysis of funding and market illiquidity variables.
FLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding liquidity variables. MLIQ denotes
the first principal component of the changes in the four market liquidity variables. Panel (b) reports the
factor weights in the PCA decomposition. Panel (c) reports the correlations of the FLIQ and MLIQ measures
with the standard liquidity measures defined in Section 3.
Principal component analysis of funding and market liquidity variables
(a)
Funding Liquidity Measures Market Liquidity Measures
Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
PC1 2.28 0.57 0.57 3.25 0.81 0.81
PC2 1.30 0.33 0.90 0.44 0.11 0.92
PC3 0.36 0.09 0.99 0.26 0.06 0.99
Principal component analysis - Factor weights
(b)
Funding Liquidity Measures Market Liquidity Measures
Euribor Repo MRO Noise EBAS BAS Impact ILLIQ
PC1 0.55 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.45
PC2 -0.46 -0.37 0.54 0.60 -0.28 -0.26 -0.22 0.89
PC3 -0.07 0.13 -0.72 0.68 -0.15 -0.60 0.79 -0.02
Contemporaneous Correlation Coefficients Across Liquidity Measures
(c)
Funding Liquidity Measures Market Liquidity Measures
Correlation Euribor Repo MRO Noise EBAS BAS Impact ILLIQ
FLIQ 0.84 0.88 0.65 0.60
MLIQ 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.80
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Table 5: Volatility regimes
Panel (a) reports the results from the White and the Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test for funding and
market illiquidity variables over the sample period from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. The first two columns
correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel of empirical
proxies. FLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding liquidity variables. MLIQ
denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four market liquidity variables. The last two
columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as respectively the Euribor-OIS
spread and the effective bid-ask spread. From the vStoxx index, we classify three volatility regimes. Panel
(b) reports the variances and covariances of the innovations in the market and funding illiquidity measures
in the three regimes, for the systematic components and the single measures. p-values are obtained from
bootstrap with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the
1% level.
Tests for Heteroskedasticity
(a)
Variables FLIQ MLIQ Euribor EBAS
White Statistic 19.91 34.52 11.94 24.33
Breusch-Pagan Statistic 18.64 35.37 11.20 22.98
Variance-Covariance of the innovations under different regimes
(b)
Variables Low vStoxx Interm. vStoxx High vStoxx
Variance of MLIQ 0.09 0.26 0.70
Variance of FLIQ 0.03 0.38 2.68
Covariance MLIQ, FLIQ 0.01 0.03 0.33
Variance of EBAS 0.055 0.137 0.344
Variance of EURIBOR 0.028 0.311 2.104
Covariance EBAS , EURIBOR 0.002 0.004 0.153
No. of obs. 40 250 35
Freq. of obs. 12.31% 76.92% 10.77%
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Table 6: Heteroskedasticity identification
The table shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model
based on Rigobon (2003). The first two columns correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the
principal component of a panel of empirical proxies. FLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in
the four funding liquidity variables. MLIQ denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four
market liquidity variables. The last two columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market
illiquidity as respectively the Euribor-OIS spread and the effective bid-ask spread. p-values are obtained
from bootstrap with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at
the 1% level.
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MLIQ FLIQ EBAS Euribor-OIS
β (funding to market) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(57.12) (53.90)
α (market to funding) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(28.47) (16.88)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008 0.009∗∗∗ −0.002
(4.14) (0.13) (4.33) (−0.46)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.220∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.131∗∗∗ 0.018
(−4.06) (−0.28) (−4.06) (0.34)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.380∗∗∗ 0.081 −0.012∗ 0.005
(−2.55) (0.29) (−1.86) (0.36)
End-of-month dummy −0.023 0.250∗∗∗ 0.05 0.22∗∗∗
(-0.37) (2.38) (1.06) (2.44)
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Table 8: Robustness check: Full sample of bonds
Panel (a) reports the country average statistics for the full sample of the ten Euro-area government bond
markets. We consider all fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued
by the central government and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. No. denotes
the total number of bonds for each country,Yield is the end-of-day miquote bond yield (in percentage),YTM
is the years to maturity (in years), Duration is the bond duration (in years), Coupon is the coupon rate (in
percentage), No. MM is the number of market makers, Trades is the average weekly number of transactions
per bond over the whole sample period and Size is the average trade size over the whole period. Panel
(b) shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model based
on Rigobon (2003), estimated on the full sample of bonds. The first two columns correspond to funding
and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel of empirical proxies. FLIQ is the
first principal component of the changes in the four funding liquidity variables. MLIQ denotes the first
principal component of the changes in the four market liquidity variables. The last two columns corresponds
to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as respectively the Euribor-OIS spread and the
effective bid-ask spread. p-values are obtained from bootstrap with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Statistics by country on the full sample of bonds
(a)
Country No. Yield YTM Duration Coupon No. MM Trades Size
Austria 19 3.65 10.83 7.84 4.63 28 61 4.46
Belgium 34 3.46 8.47 6.42 5.01 35 226 5.02
Finland 13 3.27 7.69 6.30 4.37 35 79 4.76
France 70 3.32 7.94 5.96 4.70 24 256 4.39
Germany 104 3.16 6.68 5.06 4.26 27 256 4.39
Greece 35 3.84 7.80 5.87 5.02 35 212 4.27
Italy 86 3.62 8.53 5.96 2.36 51 2,476 3.28
Netherlands 31 3.29 8.25 6.22 4.35 28 105 5.78
Portugal 21 3.65 9.20 7.02 4.50 37 215 4.89
Spain 39 3.56 8.70 6.40 4.65 37 187 4.88
Heteroskedasticity identification on the full sample of bonds
(b)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MLIQ FLIQ EBAS Euribor-OIS
β (funding to market) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(5.18) (20.83)
α (market to funding) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(32.64) (3.16)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.008 0.033∗∗∗ 0.064
(3.99) (1.17) (5.25) (1.16)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.050∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.151∗∗∗ 0.070
(−1.86) (−1.92) (−3.69) (0.18)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.160∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.440∗ −0.465
(−2.02) (−0.08) (−1.86) (−0.19)
End-of-month dummy 0.038 0.220∗∗∗ 1.270 1.840∗∗∗
(0.64) (2.09) (1.52) (2.39)
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Table 9: Robustness check: before / during the financial crisis
The table shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model
based on Rigobon (2003). Panel (a) reports the results on the non-crisis period (from Oct 1, 2004 to Sept
30, 2008), while Panel (b) reports the results on the crisis period (from Oct 1, 2008 to Feb 28, 2011). The
first two columns correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel
of empirical proxies. FLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding liquidity
variables. MLIQ denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four market liquidity variables.
The last two columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as respectively
the Euribor-OIS spread and the effective bid-ask spread. p-values are obtained from bootstrap with 1,000
replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Before the financial crisis (from Oct 1, 2004 to Sept 30, 2008)
(a)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MLIQ FLIQ EBAS Euribor-OIS
β (funding to market) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(27.66) (28.21)
α (market to funding) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(35.61) (8.63)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(3.06) (0.11) (2.18) (2.32)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.18∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.083∗∗∗ 0.064
(−2.61) (−0.82) (−2.21) (−1.10)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.00 0.00 −0.002 0.003
(−0.86) (1.12) (−0.33) (1.22)
End-of-month dummy −0.04 0.24∗∗∗ 0.022 0.054
(-0.53) (2.76) (0.56) (0.88)
During the financial crisis (from Oct 1, 2008 to Feb 28, 2011)
(b)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MLIQ FLIQ EBAS Euribor-OIS
β (funding to market) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(39.68) (11.32)
α (market to funding) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.020
(13.48) (1.62)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.010∗∗∗ −0.009
(2.93) (1.99) (1.98) (−1.34)
Variation in M2 money supply 0.14 −0.57∗∗∗ −0.006 0.199
(0.63) (−2.38) (−0.03) (0.85)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.007∗∗∗ 0.001
(−2.38) (0.12) (−2.03) (0.82)
End-of-month dummy −0.00 0.27∗∗∗ 0.110 0.354∗∗∗
(0.02) (1.76) (0.88) (2.17)
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Table 10: Robustness check: Quantile regressions
The table reports the p-values of the null-hypothesis H0 : φm = φq computed by estimating quantile
regressions. φ = α, β as in equations (1) and (2) of the main text and m, q are the median and q-percentile,
respectively.
H0: φm = φ0.7 φm = φ0.8 φm = φ0.95
First principal components
funding to market (β) 0.60 0.12 0.88
market to funding (α) 0.99 0.93 0.75
Direct measures
funding to market (β) 0.85 0.14 0.46
market to funding (α) 0.58 0.97 0.54
Table 11: Robustness check: Volatility regimes defined based on rolling-window
variances
In line with Rigobon and Sack (2003), we define the various regimes globally from the reduced-form residuals
by computing rolling-window variances of 20-week worth of observations for each variable. A high (low)
volatility regime is assigned if the volatility of that variable is larger (smaller) than its average value plus
the value of the average volatility times a coefficient c = 0.5. The Table reports the results of the estimation
of the reduced-form model a la Rigobon (2003) defined in (3), on the subsample of 149 bonds as well as on
the full sample. Values in parenthesis denote the t-values obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.
∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Subsample of 149 bonds Full sample
Variables MLIQ FLIQ MLIQ FLIQ
First Principal components
beta 0.150∗∗∗ (78.10) 0.132∗∗∗ (32.91)
alpha 0.067∗∗∗ (25.06) 0.04∗∗∗ (11.25)
Direct proxies
beta 0.039∗∗∗ (6.12) 0.132∗∗∗ (23.41)
alpha 0.052∗∗∗ (2.09) 0.107∗∗∗ (19.35)
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Table 12: Robustness check: Rigobon and Sack (2003) identification
The Table reports the estimates of an identification model based on Rigobon and Sack (2003). The model
controls for an unobservable common shock, but prevents the complete characterisation of the alpha pa-
rameter. Instead, we obtain theta = (1+alpha*gamma)/(beta+gamma). Values in parenthesis denote the
t-values obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level.
Subsample of 149 bonds Full sample
Variables MLIQ FLIQ MLIQ FLIQ
First Principal components
beta 0.164∗∗∗ (19.70) 0.141∗∗∗ (28.31)
theta 0.223∗∗∗ (14.89) 0.280∗∗∗ (8.45)
Direct proxies
beta 0.182∗∗∗ (14.70) 0.104∗∗∗ (16.70)
theta 0.167∗∗∗ (15.64) 0.446∗∗∗ (9.92)
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